

## Message Text

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ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 /026 W  
----- 059178

R 110523Z SEP 73  
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 9723  
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN  
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT  
USINT CAIRO  
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 2 TEL AVIV 7092

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS  
TAGS: PFOR, PINT, IS, XF  
SUBJ: AMBASSADOR'S CALL ON DAYAN

1. SUMMARY. DURING COURSE OF 45 MINUTE MEETING, DAYAN NOTED THERE WOULD BE NO MAJOR CHANGE IN PARTY ALIGNMENT AFTER ELECTIONS AND DESCRIBED THE LABOR PARTY PLATFORM TOWARD OCCUPIED TERRITORIES AS GOOD POLITICS, SINCE ONLY EFFECTIVE OPPOSITION IS FROM RIGHT WHICH IS MOST HAWKISH AS CONCERNS THIS SUBJECT. I ASKED HIM HIS VIEWS ON POSSIBLE EFFECT OF THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE LABOR PARTY PLATFORM ON THE FUTURE OF ARAB-ISRAELI RELATIONS. IN REPLY HE EMPHASIZED THE REQUIREMENT FOR ISRAEL TO IMPROVE WELL-BEING OF ARABS IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES AND STRESSED THE UNOFFICIAL BENEFITS THIS WOULD HAVE FOR ISRAELI-JORDANIAN RELATIONS AND PALESTINIAN-JORDANIAN RELATIONS. DAYAN DID NOT MENTION SUBJECT OF POSSIBLE NEGOTIATIONS NOR DID HE REFER TO JEWISH SETTLEMENT IN THE TERRITORIES. END SUMMARY.

2. I PAID MY INITIAL CALL ON DEFMIN MOSHE DAYAN MONDAY MORNING, SEPT 10. WE HAD A MOST CORDIAL TALK WICH LASTED OVER 45 MINUTES. DCM AND DATT ACCOMPANIED. AFTER USUAL AMENITIES, I ASKED DAYAN FOR HIS EVALUATION OF OUTCOME OF ELECTIONS. DAYAN RESPONDED THAT IN HIS OPINION THERE WOULD BE NO SIGNIFICANT CHANGES IN PARTY LINEUPS IN THE KNESSET. COMMENT: SINCE HE MADE CONFIDENTIAL

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NO CLAIM THAT LABOR ALIGNMENT WOULD INCREASE ITS STRENGTH, THIS APPRAISAL MEANS TO ME THAT HE ANTICIPATES LOSING SOME SEATS. I TOLD HIM I WAS INTERESTED, AS A FORMER PRACTICING POLITICIAN IN HIS EVALUATION OF THE IMPACT ON THE ELECTORATE OF THE RECENTLY

ADOPTED LABOR PARTY POLICY TOWARD THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES, ADDING THAT I DIDN'T SUPPOSE THIS PROPOSAL WOULD "LOSE ANY VOTES." DAYAN RESPONDED WITH GOOD HUMOR THAT I WAS CORRECT, THE LABOR PARTY WOULD NOT BE HURT IN THE ELECTIONS BY THE ADOPTION OF THIS POLICY. HE THEN PROCEEDED TO EXPLAIN THAT THE ONLY EFFECTIVE OPPOSITION IN THE ELCTIONS CAME FROM THE RIGHT WHICH WAS KNOWN FOR ITS EXTREME HAWKISHNESS ON THE SUBJECT OF THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES. HE ADDED THAT ONLY THE "COMMUNISTS" WOULD VOTE IN FAVOR OF A DOVISH POLICY TOWARDS THE TERRITORIES - AS PROPOSED BY ELIAV - BUT THESE PEOPLE WERE NOT IMPORTANT NUMERICALLY OR POLITICALLY.

3. I ASKED DAYAN TO PROJECT WITH ME FOUR YEARS HENCE AND TO SPECULATE ON WHAT EFFECT, IF ANY, HE THOUGHT THAT IMPLEMENTATION OF THE LABOR PARTY PLATFORM WOULD HAVE ON ARAB-ISRAELI RELATIONS. IN REPLY, DAYAN MADE THE FOLLOWING POINTS AS HE DISCOURSED ON GOI POLICY TOWARD THE TERRITORIES:

(A) THE GOI HAD A HUMAN OBLIGATION TO TRY TO IMPROVE THE WELL-BEING OF THE ARAB INHABITANTS OF THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES, AND THIS WAS SO DESPITE THE FACT THAT ISRAEL WOULD RECOGNIZE THAT IMPROVING LIVING STANDARDS WOULD NOT RECONCILE THE ARABS TO LIVING UNDER ISRAELI DOMINATION NOR MUTE THE "NATIONAL ASPIRATIONS." OF THESE ARABS.

(B) GAZA REPRESENTED BY FAR THE MOST COMPLEX PROBLEM, SINCE IT COULD NOT SURVIVE AS AN INDEPENDENT ENTITY; THIS LEFT THE OPTION OF AFFILIATION WITH EGYPT, JORDAN OR ISRAEL. THE GAZANS, REFUGEES AND ORIGINAL INHABITANTS ALIKE, HAVE NO CLEAR IDEA OF WHAT THEY WANT. THERE REALLY IS NO PROSPECT FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF INDUSTRIES IN GAZA (OR THE WEST BANK) SINCE THE REQUIRED HEAVY CAPITALIZATION WOULD NOT BE FORTHCOMING. ECONOMICALLY, THEREFORE, GAZA'S ONLY HOPE IS INCREASED ECONOMIC INTEGRATION WITH ISRAEL (I.E., ARABS WORKING IN ISRAEL), AND THE PROGRESSIVE REHABILITATION AND/OR RESETTLEMENT OF REFUGEES IN THE HOPE OF ENDING THE REFUGEE MENTALITY AND CULTURE.

(C) IMPLEMENTATION OF THE LABOR PARTY POLICY IN THE WEST BANK  
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WOULD IMPROVE THE LOT OF THE ARABS, AND THOUGH CONTINUED "OPEN BRIDGES" POLICY AND CONTINUED PERSONAL AND COMMERCIAL INTERCHANGES BETWEEN THE EAST AND WEST BANKS, LEAD TO "SOME FORM OF UNOFFICIAL NORMALIZATION." FOR DAYAN, THIS PROCESS BETWEEN THE EAST AND WEST BANKS COULD, WITH TIME, IMPROVE UNOFFICIAL RELATIONS BETWEEN ISRAEL AND JORDAN, BETWEEN ISRAEL AND THE PALESTINIANS AND BETWEEN THE PALESTINIANS AND JORDANIANS. HE CITED THE RECENT DECISION OF A JORDANIAN BANK TO LOAN IL 5 MILLION TO THE MUNICIPALITY OF NABLUS AS AN INDICATION THAT THE JORDANIAN GOVERNMENT AT LEAST TACITLY APPROVED OF AND WAS ENGAGED IN THIS POLICY OF UNOFFICIAL TOGETHERNESS. HE HOPED THE JORDANIANS WOULD CONTINUE TO TAKE SUCH STEPS, AND HE NOTED THAT FOUR JORDANIAN MPS WHO LIVE IN THE WEST BANK DRIVE FREELY TO

AND FROM AMMAN TO REPRESENT THEIR CONSTITUTENTS. DAYAN CON-  
CLUDED HIS COMMENTS ON THE WEST BANK AND GAZA BY EXPRESSING  
THE HOPE THAT IMPLEMENTATION OF THE LABOR PARTY PLATFORM IN THE  
NEXT FOUR YEARS IN GAZA AND THE WEST BANK (IN PARALLEL WITH  
JORDAN'S REFUGEE REHABILITATION PROGRAM) WOULD EFFECTIVELY RE-  
SETTLE WELL OVER HALF OF THE 1948 REFUGEES -- I.E., THOSE IN GAZA,  
WEST BANK AND JORDAN.

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ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 /026 W

----- 059124

R 110523Z SEP 73

FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 9724  
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN  
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT  
USINT CAIRO  
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 2 TEL AVIV 7092

EXDIS

(D) DAYAN STATED THAT THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE LABOR PARTY  
PLATFORM WOULD HAVE NO EFFECT AS CONCERNS ISRAELI-EGYPTIAN  
RELATIONS, SINCE THE ISSUES BETWEEN THEM ARE SINAI AND THE  
QUESTION OF "PRINCIPLE." IN THIS RESPECT, DAYAN STATED THAT  
EGYPT MUST CHANGE ITS BASIC VIEW WHICH IS TOTALLY NEGATIVE.  
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PLAN, THEREFORE, WILL NOT MAKE THE  
SITUATION BETWEEN ISRAEL AND EGYPT ANY WORSE.

(E) DAYAN STATED THAT JORDAN COULD NOT TAKE THE FIRST STEP,  
MAKING CLEAR ISRAEL EXPECTED NO EARLY INITIATIVE FOR A SETTLE-  
MENT WITH JORDAN. HIS OTHER REMARKS ON JORDAN WERE TIED IN  
WITH HIS COMMENTS CONCERNING GOI POLICY TOWARDS GAZA AND THE  
WEST BANK REPORTED ABOVE.

4. TURNING TO SITUATION IN EGYPT, DAYAN WAS NOT SURE WHETHER  
SADAT'S RECENT INTERNATIONAL ACTIVITY WAS A SIGN OF HIS BEING  
STRONGER OR WEAKER. HE NOTED THAT SADAT'S POSITION AT HOME IS  
SECURE SINCE THE EGYPTIAN PUBLIC IS VERY PASSIVE AND THE ARMY  
IS NOT ONLY PASIVE BUT DETERIORATING. SADAT'S STRENGTHIN THESE  
CIRCUMSTANCES DERIVES FROM THE FACT THAT NO ONE REALLY EXPECTS  
ANYTHING OF HIM. DAYAN BELIEVES SADAT WILL FIND IT SAFER AS  
WELL AS EASIER ONLY TO TALK ABOUT THE UNSOLVED ISRAELI PROBLEM  
(AND TO SET NO DEADLINES FOR ACTION) THAN TO TAKE ANY RESPONSIBILITY  
FOR STEPS WHICH COULD LEAD TO A SETTLEMENT. SADAT WILL NOT,

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THEREFORE, DO ANYTHING TO ACTIVATE STEPS TOWARDS AN INTERIM SETTLEMENT OR ANY OTHER KIND OF SETTLEMENT.

5. COMMENT: I FOUND MY CONVERSATION WITH DAYAN TO BE A MOST USEFUL OPPORTUNITY FOR FIRST-HAND EXPOSE TO THIS ENIGMATIC AND MOST CHARISMATIC MAN. HE DEFTLY AVOIDED THE MAIN THRUST OF MY QUESTION CONCERNING THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE LABOR PARTY PLATFORM BY NOT EVEN MENTIONING THE POSSIBILITY OR DESIRABILITY OF NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN ISRAEL AND THE ARABS IN THE NEAR FUTURE. ALSO, DAYAN DID NOT MENTION THE THEME THAT THE "CREATION OF FACTS" IN THE TERRITORIES COULD FORCE THE ARABS TO THE NEGOTIATING TABLE, A LINE WHICH HAS BEEN EXPOUSED BY HIS SUPPORTERS AND WHICH HAS ALSO BEEN ATTRIBUTED TO HIM. DAYAN CLEARLY WISHED TO AVOID THE SUBJECTS OF JEWISH SETTLEMENT AND NEGOTIATIONS. THIS WAS, OF COURSE, NEITHER THE TIME NOR THE PLACE FOR ME TO INITIATE A DISCUSSION ON THESE PARTICULAR POINTS, SO I DID NOT PRESS. AS I WAS LEAVING I ASKED DAYAN IF HE HAD ANY SPECIAL MESSAGE THAT I MIGHT PASS ON. IN REPLY HE NOTED THAT I HAD HAD AN OPPORTUNITY FOR A LONG CONVERSATION WITH MRS. MEIR, AND HE PROCEEDED TO PRAISE HER IN MOST LAUDATORY FASHION. MY COLLEAGUES NOTE THAT DAYAN HAS IN PAST BEEN BURNED BY GIVING THE IMPRESSION TO MRS MERI THAT HE WAS DEALING WITH THE U.S. BEHIND HER BACK. HE APPARENTLY WAS TAKING NO CHANCES ON THIS OCCASION.

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<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

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